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Acid Test: a conclusive test of success and value.
—Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999)
A ligning the multiple identities of the corporation is one of the most critical tasks to be undertaken by senior executives. Where meaningful identity misalignments occur the result can be del-eterious. When placed in context, the following quote from the 
“Values” section of a company report of 1998 provides a powerful example of 
the damage caused by identity misalignments—in this case between corporate 
communications (communicated identity) and an organization’s distinctive traits 
(actual corporate identity). It read as follows: 
“We treat others as we would like to be treated ourselves. We do not tolerate 
abusive or disrespectful treatment. Ruthlessness, callousness and arrogance don’t 
belong here.”1
The company was Enron.
The AC3ID Test
How can senior managers diagnose and resolve the identity misalign-
ments that regularly characterize their organization? The framework outlined 
here seeks to address the above.2 It is based on the premise that there are six 
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critical identity types/questions that senior executives of the modern corpora-
tion need to ensure are broadly calibrated with each other. Each of the afore-
mentioned is characterized by a distinct identity type, linked to a corporate-level 
concept/issue of fundamental importance.
The six facets of the framework form the acronym AC3ID Test (actual,
communicated, conceived, covenanted, ideal, and desired). The modus vivendi of the 
framework is that senior executives should ensure that there is dynamic congru-
ence rather than perfect alignment among the six identity types that inform this 
framework. Of course, there will never be absolute alignment among the various 
identity types: indeed, it would be hazardous if this were to be the case since in 
our view this would characterize a myopic and moribund institution. The chang-
ing dynamic of the external environment (as captured by the ideal identity) 
means that change is an indispensable “life giving” characteristic of organizations 
of whatever type. Our characterization of corporate identity (“Actual Identity”) 
reflects the current understanding of corporate identity in terms of an organiza-
tion’s defining characteristics rather than reflecting the traditional concern with 
systems of visual identification.3 Table 1 outlines the principal characteristics of 
Balmer’s AC3ID framework, which in this version has been adapted to include 
the important dimension of the corporate brand.
The Changing Face of British Airways
In this article, we examine six identity-related eras that have character-
ized the recent history of British Airways (BA).4 In selecting BA as the primary 
vehicle for elaborating the identity framework discussed here, we were able to 
draw on the close associations that we, both individually and collectively, have 
with the airline and its senior management since the early 1990s. In addition, 
the recent history of British Airways is a powerful and interesting narrative of 
corporate survival, recovery, and success that has few parallels. It is an account 
of how a struggling, loss-making, and moribund state-owned airline overcame 
Critical Concern Identity Type Concept Time Frame
What we really are Actual Corporate Identity Present
What we say we are Communicated Corporate 
Communications
Past/Present
What we are seen to be Conceived Corporate Image Past/Present
What the brand stands for Covenanted Corporate Brand Past/Present
What we ought to be Ideal Corporate Strategy Future
What we wish to be Desired CEO Vision Future
TABLE 1. Balmer's AC3ID Test of Corporate Brand Management
Note: See Appendix A for background information on the AC3ID Test and further background on the BA study.
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considerable inertia and metamorphosed into a customer-focused, profitable, 
and publicly traded corporation. It is a narrative of how identity-based views 
of the corporation were, intuitively, at the forefront of the strategic thinking of 
senior figures within the airline. The managers who piloted British Airways from 
the late 1970s to the turn of the millennium were Lord King and Lord Mar-
shall, and we draw on their comments to us over the last two decades about the 
momentous changes they effected during these years. Under their charge, they 
implemented a series of identity changes that in our view were audacious, dra-
matic, and, for the most part, highly successful.
In chronicling BA’s transformation over the last three decades we employ 
the AC3ID Test framework outlined above. However, our analysis also shows 
the inherent difficulties of correctly discerning strategic misalignments as char-
acterized by one dramatic failure to align the airline’s identities in the late 
1990s, namely, BA’s “World Images” graphic design and related communications 
initiatives.
The Early Years
BA’s provenance is a truly remarkable one. Its roots are to be found in 
the halcyon days of the British Empire when, in 1924, four small British airlines 
were merged to become what was then known as Imperial Airways.5 Established 
at the behest of the British Government, 
the airline provided important means 
of transport and a critical communica-
tions network not only for well-to-do 
passengers, but also, critically, for those 
involved in affairs of state that were 
dispatched to all parts of the imperial 
realm. To burnish Britain’s prestige and 
what was seen as Imperial Airways’ pre-
eminence, the British Government gave 
financial support to the airline; this mir-
rored the approach taken by Continental 
European governments, which also sup-
ported their countries’ fledgling airlines.
As part of this policy, Imperial Airways 
was granted a national monopoly. Imperial Airways had, de facto, become not 
only an instrument of Pax Britannica, but also a marque of Britishness in national 
and international contexts.
In 1935, concerns about Britain’s aviation interests on the European 
Continent and in South America by the British Government led to the birth of 
a sister airline to Imperial Airways, British Airways (BA). In its formative years 
it was led by the legendary Lord Reith, who had previously served as the first 
director general of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the architect 
of what became internationally known as public sector broadcasting. The brand 
name of British Airways was to disappear temporarily in 1939 with the nation-
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alization of the British airline sector, but arose, phoenix-like, in 1974 when the 
state-controlled airline sector was restructured with the establishment of a single 
national carrier.
It is at this juncture in the airline’s history that we begin our examination 
of BA by making reference to the AC3ID Test. The six eras of identity change 
described below are outlined in Figure 1 and cover the distinct periods from the 
late 1970s to the early years of this century. The fact that so many identity mis-
alignments occurred during such a relatively short period of time clearly suggests 
that examining the corporation via the lenses of identity is not merely desirable, 
but is indeed a strategic necessity.
British Airways “Appalling” Era:
Pre-1980s (Aligning Actual and Ideal Identities)
Our narrative begins in earnest in 1974 when British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (BOAC) and British European Airways (BEA) merged in order to 
form a single, nationalized airline carrier: British Airways. However, the cir-
cumstances surrounding BA’s birth were far from propitious and did not augur 
well for the fledgling brand. Specifically, as a state concern, the airline suffered 
from government inertia, rising debt, lack of strategic focus, ineffective manage-
ment, and, significantly, was characterized by a product orientation rather than 
customer orientation. For instance, many pilots were former Royal Air Force 
officers who, although they had impeccable credentials as top-notch pilots, 
appeared to view BA as a type of flying club for the upper crust. Certainly, they 
appeared to have a myopic mindset when it came to passengers: their usual 
previous cargo had, more often than not, been bombs. Internally, there were 
tensions; BOAC’s employees, who worked on intercontinental routes, adopted 
a superior attitude to their colleagues of BEA who staffed the less-glamorous 
routes in Great Britain and on the Continent. Back in 1994, remarking on this 
era, Sir John King (later ennobled as Lord King of Wartnaby) told us that the 
prevailing attitude of these pilots was that flights “were something of a jolly” and 
Era Time Frame Identity Imperative
“Appalling” Era Pre-1980s Aligning the Actual with the Ideal identity
“Adjusting” Era Early 1980s Aligning the Actual with the Desired identity
“Appealing” Era Mid-1980s Aligning the Communicated with the Ideal identity
“Adoring” Era Late 1980s/
Early 1990s
Aligning the Communicated with the Covenanted identity
“Astonishing” Era Late 1990s Aligning the Communicated with the Desired Identity (but BA failed 
to take cognizance of the Actual and Covenanted identities)
“Affirming” Era Early 2000s Aligning the Communicated with the Covenanted identity
FIGURE 1. British Airways Identity Misalignments (circa mid-1970s through early 2000s)
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that if the public wished to join them for a spin, well, “they were welcome.”6 BA’s 
monopoly on national routes and its indifferent levels of service led to BA earn-
ing the sobriquet “Bloody Awful” among the media and travelling public. More-
over, the carrier’s labor relations were generally considered to be frightful and 
there was a general consensus that BA was over manned.7 This explains why we 
have characterized this era as “appalling.”
There were, however, some aspects of the airline’s situation that were 
both unique as well as positive. Among BA’s identity assets were the flight-deck 
personnel who were reputed to perform to exacting standards of safety, Britain’s 
imperial past that had resulted in the establishment of an extensive global route 
network, and BA’s privileged access to London’s Heathrow Airport—arguably 
the world’s most profitable airport for carriers. As Lord Marshall told us: 
“There is no doubt that the state-owned British Airways, which emerged from the 
amalgamation of BEA and BOAC, was technically proficient with high operat-
ing and maintenance standards. The problem was that, for many economic and 
political reasons, the airline had become over-manned and driven by the needs of 
its own production processes, not by those of the marketplace. This introversion 
caused it to lose sight of the customer.”
Looking at the above through an identity lens, we conclude that the prin-
cipal identity problem confronting the airline during this period was the lack 
of alignment between the ideal identity (what we ought to be) with the actual
identity (what we really are). A myopic, product-oriented mindset, demoralized 
staff, a lack of funding, and weak leadership characterized the actual identity.
Yet, what is palpably obvious is that BA required a strategy where the corporate 
identity was not only substantively customer-focused, safe, and profitable (ideal
identity), but also one that capitalized on its assets.
British Airways “Adjusting” Era:
Early 1980s (Aligning Actual and Desired Identities)
By 1981, BA had a new chairman, Sir John King. British Prime Minis-
ter Margaret Thatcher had appointed King to undertake the task of turning the 
airline from a loss-making, state-owned concern to a profitable company in 
the private sector. This was part of a radical agenda by the British Government 
(“Thatcherism”) where the frontiers of the British State were to be rolled-back 
and, for state-owned entities such as BA, they were to be subject to the strictures 
of market forces.8 As he described it to us, two concerns were uppermost in the 
mind of Sir John: first, to place the airline on a firm financial footing and, sec-
ond, to improve staff self-esteem.
Financially, BA was under clear strictures from the British Government 
that had moved away from the dirigisme policies that had characterized British 
industry during the 1970s. However, the turn-around was to be done without 
further resources from the government. Prime Minister Thatcher constantly 
reminded BA’s chairman, as he told us back in 1994, of the government’s man-
date with the words, “Remember John, there is no money.” He was also charged by 
the Prime Minister to prepare the airline for privatization, so King appointed a 
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new board of directors consisting of individuals who had the requisite commer-
cial and marketing skills. The appointment of Colin Marshall as BA’s CEO was to 
prove to be the most propitious of King’s appointments.
King was confronted with a dire financial situation: BA carried an over-
draft of almost £1bn. As he told us:
“The first, and most important, change I made at BA was to establish the business 
on a stable financial basis. Without cash there could be no question of improving 
the company’s image or changing the company’s identity. Without cash a com-
pany simply ceases to exist.”
Drastic measures were called for, and routes, capacity, and non-core activities 
were pruned.
Although many airline staff were made redundant, King was determined 
to bolster employee morale, realizing that this is a prerequisite for a service-
based organization. Reflecting on staff morale during this period, Lord Marshall 
commented:
“Employees, especially those in direct customer contact, had become disillusioned 
and demotivated. None of them, I believe, went to work wanting to do a bad job 
but the system worked against them. Turning round the people was the prerequi-
site to turning round the business.”
A decade later, Lord King recalled for us how and why BA had initiated 
a brief focused communications program directed primarily at employees. In 
our terms, this initiative was aimed at capturing King’s vision (desired identity) 
for the airline and communicating change from the actual identity of that period.
A highly visible component of the program took place in conjunction with the 
Queen’s televised annual message on Christmas afternoon. At peak family-
viewing time, a multi-minute advertorial-style BA commercial message empha-
sized the positive aspects of the airline, implying a turn-around with brighter 
prospects.
Although employees (and their families) were the principal target audi-
ence, the use of television for a “feel good about BA” message broadened the 
audience substantially to other stakeholders, including customers, vendors, 
influential individuals, and members of the general public (who were the air-
line’s ultimate owners as a state-owned entity).
Clearly this was an expensive step and to many an audacious approach. It 
became a topic of considerable discussion and debate. Although seen as a heroic 
gesture by some, it also had its detractors, who were amazed at the profligacy of 
the gesture. Lord King told us that his critics had completely missed the point, 
since to him such efforts were not so much a luxury as a commercial necessity: 
“Many thought, ‘What an expensive piece of marketing’! Well, they missed the 
point! At the time BA’s workforce had been cut by one third, the quality of service 
was a joke for many customers, and employees for years had been reading how 
much the company was losing. I wanted an advertisement that would make my 
staff feel proud.”
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In the earlier “appalling” period, we saw how the airline urgently needed 
to transform its actual identity (moribund and product-led) to that of an ideal 
identity (customer-focused and commercially viable concern).
The principal identity problem confronting the airline during this period 
was the lack of alignment between the desired identity (what we wish to be) with 
the actual identity (what we really are). The engine of change was the vision 
(desired identity) of Lord King, who imbued his indelible mark on the organiza-
tion not only through his appointment of a new board of directors, but, in addi-
tion, by the importance accorded to staff (as evinced by the communications 
initiative described above).
British Airways “Appealing” Era:
Mid-1980s (Aligning Communicated and Ideal Identities)
As the airline moved inextricably towards privatization, King wanted the 
negative associations of the airline’s former identity to be consigned to history.
There was a need to communicate this to customers, employees, and would-be 
investors in the privatized corporation. Although King was an accomplished 
communicator, he realized that BA required the services of a consummate mar-
keter to oversee the next stage of the carrier’s evolution and Colin Marshall 
was identified as the best person to fill this role and was duly appointed as CEO 
(with King holding the position of Chairman of BA). Marshall’s credentials were 
impeccable in that he not only had held senior management positions at Avis (in 
its “We try harder” period), Hunt-Wesson foods, and the British retailer Sears, 
but, importantly, had first-hand customer experience as a purser on the Orient 
Shipping Line that operated between Great Britain and the Antipodes. His role 
at BA was one that was to attract considerable attention on the global stage.9
At this juncture, it is important to note that the process of identity align-
ment (especially the radical transformation of the actual identity so that it cali-
brated with the ideal identity) can take many years to effect. As Colin Marshall 
noted, the task of turning around the airline was akin to an archaeological dig 
in that once the dust and debris of ages had been cleared, the jewels could be 
uncovered and the brightest of them would be the very professional and highly 
skilled BA employees. However, they operated in an environment that was 
antithetical to a market-led and customer focused organization.10 In response, 
Marshall initiated and personally drove an ambitious and exhaustive training 
program entitled “Putting People First,” the primary accent of which was one of 
superior customer service. He also led from the front and was highly visible, 
mingling with crew and passengers alike. Surveying this period, Lord Marshall 
outlined to us the enormity of the task confronting BA: 
“What effectively we had to do was throw away the past—the aircraft fleets and 
their on-board service, the airport facilities and passenger-handling systems, the 
reservations procedure and sales process—in fact, the entire inherited corporate 
identity. All we had left, mentally, were the customers and it was their choices 
and preferences—identified by consultation, market research, and personal dia-
logues—that formed the base for re-building.”
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With his considerable experience as a marketer, Colin Marshall intuitively 
realized that the corporate communications (communicated identity) also needed 
to mirror BA’s strategy (ideal identity). Under Marshall’s leadership, such a trans-
formation was executed quickly and with a style appropriate to the challenge.
For example, a new system of visual identification was commissioned from 
Landor (the renowned San Francisco-based graphic design consultancy); this 
resulted in the adoption of an assured, arresting, and contemporary house style 
that incorporated a recognizably British design vernacular: heraldry. This seemed 
to complement in graphic design terms what Marshall’s staff training programs 
aimed to achieve: a traditional Britishness equated with calmness, efficiency, and 
politeness. In a similar mode, the de facto adoption of a corporate musical theme 
(the Flower Duet from Delibes’ opera Lakme) was accorded a high profile, and it 
was used with some flair in BA’s advertisements, in-flight communications, and 
call centers. In another bold move, Marshall retained Saatchi & Saatchi, a rising 
and innovative firm in the advertising agency world led by the legendary Saatchi 
brothers. The agency’s advertisements for BA were considered among the most 
creative and celebrated of this period.
Having begun the task of changing the actual identity, a key activity of 
this period (and leading up to privatization) was for the communicated identity
(what we say we are) to reflect the ideal identity (what we ought to be). This was 
being articulated via various communications channels, including a new visual 
identity, a creative advertising campaign, and the adoption of a theme tune, 
among others.
British Airways “Adoring” Era: Late 1980s, Early 1990s 
(Aligning Communicated and Covenanted Identities)
In 1987, British Airways was privatized and became perhaps the most 
celebrated privatization program of the Thatcher government, with visibility on 
the global stage. However the metamorphosis of British Airways was far from 
complete. Both Marshall and King realized that the airline’s fortunes would, to 
a considerable degree, be dependent on BA attaining as well as communicating 
brand values to global audiences. To us, these corporate brand values needed 
to connote high quality and élan, and at the same time signal accessibility to 
a broad set of audiences. This would enable the airline to establish a strong 
bond with customers as well as bolster the emotional bond with employees.
In this context, a corporate brand is akin to a covenant, in that at its apogee it 
represents an emotional and thereby powerful compact between the corpora-
tion and its stakeholders: the brand name is linked to certain associations and 
expectations.
Although corporate branding is closely related to an organization’s iden-
tity, it is not, we believe, an identical construct. In effect, it relates to the sum-
mation of the organization’s identity in terms of an espoused set of identifiable 
values, and in turn becomes shorthand for recognizing and evaluating a compa-
ny’s activities. For staff it provides a standard for service delivery. For customers 
and other key stakeholder groups it represents the organization’s covenant with 
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them reflected in performance and service. Taking a broader historical context, 
airlines such as Pan American World Airways and KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines 
have long appreciated the efficacy of an integrated corporate identity and brand-
ing strategy.11
There was much from BA’s heritage to distill from its actual identity in 
building its brand (covenanted identity) including its enviable international net-
work, its privileged position at Heathrow Airport, its legacy of innovation (it 
was one of two carriers then offering supersonic flights on Concorde), its safety 
record, its dramatically enhanced customer service, and positive associations 
garnered from a certain type of traditional Britishness. Furthermore, in 1992 the 
magazine Air Transport World awarded BA the title of Airline of the Year: one in 
fifteen passengers taking an international flight anywhere flew with BA.12
It was from this that BA developed a brand positioning platform based on 
the strap line “The World’s favourite airline,” uttered by the internationally recog-
nized English actor Robert Morley. Speaking to us about this period, Lord Mar-
shall remarked:
“By this time, we were engaged in a strategy to build a global airline for a global 
marketplace. In addition to our own growing network, we had secured important 
international commercial partnerships and investments across the world. Overseas 
markets now accounted for no less than 60% of our total business.”
Lord Marshall went on to elaborate his view of the critical importance of BA’s 
corporate branding activities and how this materially contributed to the airline’s 
success during this period:
“Introducing the concept of branding was crucial. Not only was this a ground-
breaking innovation for British Airways, it was also a completely new—probably 
revolutionary—idea for the airline industry in general. The aim was to create a 
product, or set of products, which offered a distinctive style and delivered consis-
tency in terms of facility, service, and quality throughout. Market differentiation 
meant that we could command a premium for our services and hold up margins 
in a cutthroat business. Rather than discount and devaluate our products, we 
competed by giving customers significantly more style and value. Our employees 
responded enthusiastically because they wanted to be identified with high quality, 
not mediocrity.”
By this time, people across the entire BA organization had come to 
embrace the customer-focused philosophy espoused by senior management.
Lord Marshall saw the then-current professional and highly skilled staff (both 
those retained from the past and those subsequently recruited) as the foundation 
of a successful customer-centered brand. In this regard, Marshall later referred 
to himself as “driven by evangelistic determination to strive for customer service 
excellence.” The principles of the aforementioned “Putting People First” train-
ing program (initiated in the “Appealing” era) had permeated all levels of staff.
Indeed, Lord Marshall very recently related with pride that administrative staff 
not among the groups scheduled for training had sought to be involved; their 
view was that “we support customers indirectly by supporting BA frontline 
staff.” Moreover, recognition of the program and British Airways’ success led 
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to requests for BA to advise other organizations about analogous initiatives. In 
essence, the program had achieved organization-wide “buy-in” internally and 
considerable praise externally—both key components of BA’s successful corpo-
rate brand building in this era.
A key task of this period was for the airline’s communications (commu-
nicated identity) to reflect BA’s corporate branding credentials in global contexts 
(covenanted identity); thus corporate advertising was to have a particular promi-
nence. During this period the inventiveness and panache of the Saatchi commu-
nications program reached new heights: for instance in one commercial 1,000 
colorfully dressed extras formed a human visage that winked and smiled. A truly 
human element of change related to staff identity. Lord Marshall recalls:
“One of the small, but very important, changes we made was to insist that all staff 
wear a badge giving their names and job titles. No longer were our people anony-
mous “airline officials,” but identified professional individuals, instantly account-
able to their customers and to each other.”
In a very real sense, BA had turned rhetoric into reality and had begun 
to align its corporate communications activities (communicated identity) to capture 
key features of BA’s corporate brand promise (covenanted identity).
British Airways “Astonishing” Era: Late 1990s 
(Corporate Mis-Diagnosis of Identities—A Failure to Take 
Cognizance of the Actual and Covenanted Identities) 
In 1996, Robert Ayling became the new CEO of British Airways with 
Colin Marshall taking the role of Chairman. Research commissioned by BA 
revealed that 60 percent of British Airways customers were not British, leading 
the CEO to conclude that this necessitated BA asserting its global credentials and 
giving less prominence to its British heritage. (We have not been able to learn 
whether BA’s research had ascertained why existing passengers travelled with BA 
or the degree to which passengers found the airline’s British characteristics to be 
attractive or not—nor do we know the impact of any such research on reaching 
a decision.) What appears to be the case is that the resultant change appeared to 
reflect the sincerely held vision of the CEO and the board (desired identity) and 
was not the result of thorough research and strategic analysis (ideal identity).
The above change of direction meant that BA’s livery (the appearance 
of BA’s fleet and its graphics), which had a decidedly British character, and had 
not been altered since 1984, sat uncomfortably with the airline’s new global 
positioning. In a very radical, and certainly audacious, change of visual identity 
Newell and Sorrell (a London-based graphic design consultancy) introduced a 
design architecture consisting of not one but fifty national symbols drawn from 
all corners of the world: a single design (of the fifty) adorned the tailfin of every 
plane. The aim was to reflect the global customer base of BA. At the time, Rob-
ert Ayling asserted that the change was much deeper than the paint and was: 
“[the] physical manifestation of a fundamental review of our mission, values, and 
our corporate goals.”13
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The task of repainting an airline fleet with so many different designs was mam-
moth and complex; the process of change was code-named “Utopia.” In retro-
spect, the choice of code name was to prove inauspicious.
By downplaying its national credentials, BA had unwittingly alienated 
key members of its corporate brand community and generated a good deal of 
opprobrium from the public, media, British Members of Parliament, as well as 
disbelief from BA staff members. One commentator was incredulous that BA 
had adopted images from countries whose airlines would only be used as a last 
resort when confronted faced by an extreme emergency.14 Margaret Thatcher 
communicated her dissent by draping a handkerchief over a tail fin of a model 
British Airways plane at the Conservative Party conference in 1997. She was not 
alone in her disquiet; British travelers, the other 40 percent of passengers, par-
ticularly disliked the non-British tailfins and the change attracted much media 
attention.15
In the U.S., some of those travelling to the UK were flabbergasted that 
African and Asian symbols, rather than British iconography, adorned BA’s fleet.
Moreover, BA’s key constituency felt alienated—British citizens who comprised 
40% of its customer base, and critically the many British business travelers who 
paid premium rates for their business class seats. In short, many in Great Britain 
loathed the new house style: it was seen as a national affront in that it down-
played Britishness and severely undermined British confidence. Capitalizing 
on BA’s misguided predicament, Sir Richard Branson (head of BA’s rival airline 
Virgin Atlantic and founder of the eponymous Virgin brand) asserted that Virgin 
was now “Britain’s flag carrier” and that his airline’s livery would accord promi-
nence to the British flag.16
Lord Marshall, in reflecting on this most troublesome of periods in the 
recent annals of BA observed to us: 
“As it turned out, the airline had gone too far, too fast for its key stakeholders—
customers, shareholders, employees—and the British public. The change was too 
drastic and in the view of many weakened the strength of our brand. There was 
also the perception that the proud heritage of British Airways was being swept 
under a carpet of modernization.”
In reflecting on the above, it is clear that the policies pursued by BA’s 
executives were sincerely held and were executed with the courage and energy 
that had characterized BA’s corporate psyche since the 1980s. Although BA was 
successful in aligning the communicated identity (what we say we are) with the 
desired identity (what we wish to be) this was undertaken without recourse to 
the airline’s actual identity (what we really are) and its covenanted/corporate brand
identity (what we promise) and the ideal identity (what we ought to be.) As such, 
the initiative proved to be ill-judged. In addition, it would appear that corpo-
rate identity here (unlike earlier changes of identity) was narrowly conceived in 
terms of emphasizing graphic design to reflect management vision.
Another caveat needs to be introduced here, because certain “national” 
brands are characterized by a strong proprietary and emotional bond. As such, 
some corporate brands have a role in defining the self and, moreover, the nation,
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as with the case of BA. For this reason the corporate community can be national 
rather than institutional in scope.
British Airways “Affirming” Era: Early 2000s (Identity 
Misalignments: Communicated and Covenanted Identities)
The furor caused by the change led to what can be described only as a 
dramatic volte face on behalf of BA. The global symbolism that adorned BA’s fleet 
was gradually replaced by a single British-inspired visual image: the (British) flag 
as flown by Admiral Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar. In both instances (1805 
and the late 1990s), an overseas “threat” had been eradicated and the Union 
Flag of Britain endured, triumphant. On March 10, 2000, BA’s troubled chief 
executive Robert Ayling stepped down and was replaced by an Australian with 
an impressive track record in the airline industry, Rod Eddington.17
Eddington initiated a new strategy whereby British Airlines was to be 
positioned as a “premium airline,” a carrier that accorded primary importance to 
its long-haul routes and to its business passengers.18 As with other full-service 
airlines, BA had to take account of the emergence of no-frills airlines such as 
Easy Jet and RyanAir (in Europe), Jet Blue and Southwest (in the U.S.) and Air 
Asia, Jet Airways, Tiger Air, and Virgin Blue (in Asia and Australasia). Eddington 
realized that BA could no longer afford to be, or claim to be, the “World’s Favou-
rite Airline” by being all things to all people.
Confiding to us about this difficult period Lord Marshall noted: 
“With the appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer (bringing in a new style 
and fresh strategies was the perfect catalyst for change) the decision was therefore 
taken to scrap the ‘world images’ program and give every aircraft in the fleet the 
British Union Flag livery originally chosen for Concorde.”
He went on to tell us that:
“There is no doubt that the brand has been significantly re-strengthened. Custom-
ers, employees, and casual observers have rallied behind a new, focused image 
which strongly reaffirms the airline’s British heritage and its commitment to qual-
ity that does not detract from its global status.”
The previous dilemma, whether BA should be perceived as British or not, 
seems a distant memory in the present competitive climate in which British Air-
ways is affirming its identity.
Conclusions: The Strategic Role of Corporate Identity
In bringing our narrative of British Airways to a close we leave the reader 
with the recent reflections provided by Lord Marshall upon the strategic role 
played by corporate identity in the metamorphosis of British Airways over the 
past four decades: 
“It is clear that corporate identity and brand image are completely inter-linked 
and, in many cases, are one and the same. It is equally apparent that corporate 
and brand identity are living entities. Once launched and accepted, they no longer 
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belong to the management of an organization, but to all its stakeholders—customers, share-
holders, employees, business partners, and suppliers. The job of management is to take 
custody of corporate identity and brand image, to protect them and to strengthen 
them in the face of new business opportunity and fresh business challenge. In 
these days of greater expectations from business (corporate governance, environ-
mental care), established brands have more responsibilities than pure commerce 
and corporate identities will have to shoulder them.”
In our view, adopting an identity-based view of the corporation as encap-
sulated in the AC3ID Test affords a critically important means by which senior 
executives can understand and manage their organizations strategically. As our 
narrative reveals, calibrating an organization’s various identities—so that in their 
totality they form a meaningful whole—requires constant vigilance on the part 
of senior executives and their advisers. The framework encompasses a variety 
of disciplinary sources and time frames and accommodates internal corporate as 
well as external perspectives.
We have seen how over a considerable period of time, senior manage-
ment of British Airways, by adopting an identity-based view of the firm,19
effected strategic change within the airline, albeit with one notable failure.We 
concur with Lord Marshall that the melding of corporate identity and corporate 
brand management constitutes a strategic imperative for contemporary organi-
zations. Whereas custodianship of an organization’s identities resides with senior 
executives, the ultimate owners are of course customers, employees, and other 
key stakeholder groups.
Lessons for Senior Management
Three insights emerge from our examination of British Airways through 
an identity lens: 
6h Adopting an identity-based view of the corporation affords a powerful 
means through which we can comprehend key facets of contemporary 
organizations that need to be part of the strategic deliberations of senior 
executives.
6h An audit of the multiple identities of the corporation should be under-
taken at regular intervals and the AC3ID Test provides an effective means 
of undertaking this task.
6h The strategic imperative of achieving dynamic and meaningful align-
ment among the multiple identities of the organization is such that senior 
managers should ensure that it is part of their strategic deliberations (as 
appeared to be the case with Lords King and Marshall).
Finally, as the British Airways case history reveals, major identity mis-
alignments were a frequent occurrence over the period studied, illustrating the 
point that identities can be dynamic and are evolutionary. Moreover, they are of 
considerable strategic importance.
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APPENDIX A
Background Information on BA Case Study and the AC3ID Test
British Airways Case Study
This draws on Professor Balmer’s research on British Airways, which 
began in the early 1990s and which draws on his discussions and other materi-
als made available to him by the late Lord King of Wartnaby and Lord Marshall 
of Knightsbridge—both held positions as CEO and Chairman of British Airways.
Both have given keynote presentations at Professor Balmer’s ICIG (International 
Corporate Identity Group) symposia in 1994 (Lord King), 2001 (Lord Marshall), 
and 2007 (Lord Marshall). Also, these symposia provided a forum where iden-
tity consultancies discussed their work for BA including Landor in 1994 and 
Newell and Sorrell in 1999. It also marshals Dr. Helen Stuart’s long-time scru-
tiny of identity developments at BA, which have informed her elective courses 
on the area at undergraduate and postgraduate levels and conference presen-
tations. Professor Greyser’s intellectual interests and his participation in both 
the ACID Test’s evolution and the British Airways symposium sessions are also 
incorporated.
The AC3ID Test
Dating back to the late 1990s and developed and refined over many years 
by Professor Balmer, the AC3ID test framework aims to meet the needs of senior 
managers and their advisors by providing a diagnostic tool for identifying iden-
tity misalignments. The test grew out of a substantive stream of intellectual work 
undertaken within the UK and USA, including data collected from major corpo-
rate identity/brand consultancies and an extensive literature review of corporate 
identity including its formation and management. It was found that identity 
misalignment was a common occurrence among contemporary organizations 
and took different forms. The ACID Test was devised to detect such identity and 
brand misalignments and greatly extends identity interface theory and accom-
modates the various disciplinary roots that underpin the multiple identities of 
the corporation. The six identity types that characterize the revised framework 
(which accommodates the increasingly important dimension of the corporate 
brand) forms the acronym AC3ID:
A ACTUAL IDENTITY
The distinctive attributes of the organization, including business activities, pur-
poses, corporate style and ethos, markets covered.
C COMMUNICATED IDENTITY
The messages emitted from the organization. This encompasses outward-directed 
communication such as visual identification (logos), corporate advertising, and 
corporate public relations.
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C CONCEIVED IDENTITY
The images and reputations of the organization held by customers and other 
stakeholder groups.
C COVENANTED IDENTITY
The underlying promise that is associated with the corporate name and/or logo.
However, owing to the power and strength of association towards a corporate 
brand on the part of customers, employees, and others (which sometimes has a 
religious-like fervor), the term covenant appears to be appropriate.
I IDEAL IDENTITY
The optimum strategic (future-oriented) positioning of the organization in a 
given time frame. This is established after organizational competencies, assets, 
the competition, and changes in the political, economic, ethical, social, and tech-
nological environment have been scrutinized.
D DESIRED IDENTITY
The sought-after future positioning of the organization that lives in the hearts 
and minds of corporate leaders: it is their vision for the organization's identity 
in a given time frame. (This identity type is cognitive/aspirational in character 
whereas the Ideal identity is strategic in nature.)
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